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Abstract 
 
The primary manifestation of the demographic transition in a modern economic context is through ageing 
and the primary transmission from ageing to the macro economy is through its effect on saving and 
investment behavior. These two effects taken together suggest a strong impact from the continuing 
process of ageing on international capital flows and global macroeconomic imbalances. This paper explores 
the potential relationship between ageing on a macroeconomic level and the reliance, or outright 
dependency, on exports and foreign asset income to achieve economic growth. The paper’s argument is 
both theoretical and empirical. Using a standard overlapping generation framework (OLG) in an open 
economy context this paper discusses whether the proposed relationship between a transition into old age 
and dissaving is feasible and desirable (or even optimal?). Finally, an empirical analysis is presented on 
Germany and Japan to show how these two economies, as the oldest in the world, may exactly be in a state 
of export dependency.  
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1.0 Introduction  
In a paper from 1990 Summers et al. asked whether an ageing society represents an opportunity or 
challenge. Two decades hence, this question, which the authors answered ambiguously
1
 seems to merit a 
closer look, not least in the context of the unprecedented process of ageing which the world is experiencing 
and is set to experience in the coming decades. At a first glance, one can easily argue that ageing at one 
and the same time represents both an opportunity and a challenge. It should be seen as an opportunity 
because it is essentially a manifestation of economic development and is thus in some sense correlated 
with the increasing wellbeing of societies, particularly in an emerging economy context. In a developed 
economy context however, ageing is likely to become a challenge, not least because ageing as a joint 
function of declining fertility and increasing life expectancy does not seem to be a finite process. In 
particular, the demographic transition is not yet over and this fact raises a whole set of issues and problems 
for economists to address in the future to come. It is, at least in small part, the latter perspective which is 
the focus of this paper.  
Specifically, this paper discusses the effect of demographics on global capital flows and homes in on the 
idea that as an economy ages it may become dependent or reliant on exports and foreign asset income to 
achieve and maintain economic growth. Theoretically, this paper postulates that such dependency can be 
shown through the idea of intertemporal consumption and the fact that ageing may lead to an 
intertemporal preference for keeping domestic investment rates higher than what can be merited by 
domestic capacity. Especially, the hypothesis of aggregate dissaving as a function of ageing is challenged in 
this context not so much because it will not materialize (or already is materializing), but because it may not 
be an optimal way for an ageing economy to behave. Furthermore, this paper develops a simple analysis in 
relation to Germany and Japan (the oldest economies in the world measured on median age) that shows 
how variation in output is increasingly driven by the variation in the external balance. Finally, this paper 
asks the crucial question of what happens once we move these results to the global level and incorporate 
the fact that most OECD economies and, in fact, key emerging economies are moving towards a state of old 
age.  
The paper is structured in 6 sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework to show why ageing 
may be expected lead an economy in way of a reliance on external demand to grow. Section 3 motivates 
the choice of Germany and Japan as the main vessels of analysis and section 4 presents the empirical 
estimations and discusses the results. Section 5 provides a small perspective on global capital flows and 
section 6 concludes.  
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2.0 Theoretical Framework 
In its essence, this paper studies the effect of demographics on international capital flows and already with 
this delimitation the amount of contributions in the literature is vast. In a formal theoretical perspective, 
demographics and the effect on capital flows are usually joined through an overlappings generations model 
(OLG) following the seminal contribution by Samuelson (1958). Especially, the idea that the different rate of 
time preference (intertemporal preference) of two, or more, economies may drive capital flows is a strong 
intuitive result even though it may be difficult to operationalize in reality
2
. In a more general context, the 
idea of intertemporal consumption which easily represents one of the most fundamental principles of 
modern macroeconomics has guided many seminal contributions. Among those, Modigliani’s life cycle 
hypothesis and Modigliani and Ando (1963) and Deaton (2005) as well as Friedman’s permanent income 
hypothesis Friedman (1957) stand tall. With respect to time preference, the idea originally follows Fisher 
(1931) and the idea of a time value of money and the principle of intertemporal consumption has been 
used to formulate the idea of the intertemporal current account Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) which has 
become one of the main work-horse models in open economy macroeconomics.  
Contemporary studies have provided extensive evidence of the effect on ageing and capital flows. In 
Higgins (1998) empirical evidence is presented to suggest that ageing affect capital flows both in relation to 
the individual economy (time series) perspective and a global setting (cross-sectional). In Henriksen (2002) 
a two country OLG model is calibrated to the bilateral current account balances of Japan and the US. The 
model is found to replicate the observed pattern of intra current account balances quite well and is used to 
forecast the future path of the current account balance between the US and Japan. The model predicts that 
Japan will continue to run (bilateral) surpluses and the US running deficits for the next two decades.  
Extending the setting to a multi-country OLG model Feroli (2003) calibrates a model for the G7 economies 
that shows how demographic differences are good proxies for the drivers of international capital flows. 
Supan et al (2007) sets out to model capital flows in an intra-OECD context. The simulations of Supan et al. 
(2007) suggest how capital initially (up until 2030; Supan et al. (2007, p. 23)) will flow from the relatively old 
to the relatively young economies but that this will reverse once we get into a period of rapid dissaving as 
domestic savings decline faster than domestic investment demand. Specifically, the model predicts that the 
US will be running a persistent current account deficit (as a young economy) relative to the rest of OECD 
and especially Europe for the foreseeable future. By 2040 and 2050 and once dissaving kicks in, the regions 
should settle with a balanced external account.  
As an interim summary, it is difficult to refute the idea that ageing and demographics may act as strong 
drivers of international capital flows. This postulate not only has strong theoretical foundation in the 
context of the life cycle hypothesis, but also in relation to empirical studies.  
The theoretical and empirical challenges that remain are cast in the context of the later stages of the 
demographic transition (the phase of rapid ageing) that many OECD economies are now moving towards. 
Consequently, standard OLG models predict that rapid ageing will lead to dissaving in the aggregate as 
domestic savings decline further than domestic investment demand. This prediction has lead to a lot of 
debate not least in relation to the notion of asset meltdown which has been coined in the context of the 
retirement of the baby boomers in the US, but also expanded to a global setting Poterba (2004). Needless 
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to say, the idea of aggregate dissaving is bound to be very sensitive to country setting not to mention 
microeconomic parameters and, in general, it has been very difficult to verify in an empirical sense Supan 
(2004), but also appears difficult to consolidate in a theoretical sense. In the context of the standard 
macroeconomic modeling framework, we might postulate that the degree of dissaving predicted in a 
standard setting is difficult to reconcile with the complex degree of uncertainty facing economic individuals 
as well as potential bequest motives. More fundamentally however, it is worthwhile to ask the extent to 
which a model with micro foundations shows that some form of dissaving is optimal this does not mean 
that aggregate dissaving may be optimal from the point of view of an economic entity. The main argument 
in this paper is consequently that ageing can be related to export dependency or more specifically that 
ageing will lead a country in the direction of an intertemporal preference for running an external surplus 
even if a steady process of ageing may lead to a negative drift in the flow (and stock) of domestic savings.  
As an important initially qualifier, it should be emphasized that an economy cannot, by definition, maintain 
a surplus on its external books without another economy running a corresponding deficit. This is to say that 
there is a binding constraint on the global economy as a whole. In formal terms;  
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where iθ  is the net external position of economy i. It is in this respect that the notion of export 
dependency arises since it means that if an economy cannot spur sufficient domestic demand to reach an 
acceptable
3
 growth rate it will come to rely on external demand and thus; it will be very sensitive to sudden 
reversals in global trade and capital flows. In a theoretical context the hypothesis of export dependency 
attacks the notion of aggregate dissaving and how this may lead ageing economies to run current account 
deficits, not so much to suggest that it may not ultimately occur, but rather to ask whether this is really 
optimal from the point of view of an aggregate economy. And if this is not the case; how should we expect 
rapidly ageing economies such as Japan and Germany to behave in order to ward off the relentless decline 
in the context of dissaving. 
But, is dissaving really an inevitable result of ageing? As it turns out it is, at least in the context of a neo-
classical economic framework.  
One representation which shows this is a simple OLG model as found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and 
Supan (2007). In this model, the representative agent solves the following problem to reach an optimal 
path of consumption; 
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 Acceptable growth rate here can mean many things of course, but it could be motivated in the context of political 
expectations or more importantly in relation to financing the institutions of a welfare society at the same time as it 
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With (c) equal to consumption, (y) equal to income and (tau) equal to a lump sum tax.  Our representative 
individual faces two choice variables in this problem; consumption as a young individual (working) and 
consumption as an old individual (retired). The constrained maximization problem for the representative 
agent reads;  
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Combining these first order conditions yields the choice in optimum for the representative individual.  
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This expression tells us that consumption in the first period of life (t) is the value of consumption during the 
old years (t+1) discounted by the market as well as subjective discount rate. In other words; the product of 
the market interest rate and more importantly, the subjective discount rate determine the relationship 
between consumption and saving across the life cycle. More specifically, the subjective discount rate can 
exactly be interpreted as the way in which intertemporal preference enters this model as a form of a 
parameter of patience. Consider then the relative level of consumption in the two periods;  
 
6 
 
1(1 )
O
t
Y
t
C
r
C
β ++ =  
 
For a value of the subjective discount rate more than 1 the representative agent will be patient and thus 
value second period consumption (saving) more than current period consumption. For a value of the 
subjective discount rate below 1, the situation will be reverse.  If the subjective discount rate is 1, it has a 
neutral impact on the consumption and saving decision. Since the subjective discount rate is time invariant 
in this setup, there is a not a lot we can do in a modeling sense, but in order to capture the idea of a 
intertemporal preference as a function of age, we may simply note the subjective discount rate as a 
function of the age structure of the economy;
4
 
 
( ), if age xβ =  
 
where x is a vector of unknown and unspecified parameters also believed to influence the subjective 
discount rate. 
Moving on to an open economy representation it is natural to argue that the extent to which an aggregate 
consumption function may be derived from this model, it must depend on ageing which must also, then, 
apply for the aggregate savings function and finally the current account. Following Rogoff and Obstfeld 
(1996) the current account can be expressed as the difference (in two periods) between net foreign assets;  
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Because the model used in Rogoff and Obstfeld (1996, ch. 3) also has an active government which levies a 
lump sum tax this expression can, naturally, be written as follows;  
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where superscript (P) indicates private and superscript (G) government.  Following the intuition from the 
OLG model the aggregate consumption function must be defined as.   
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 Ideally, we would make it a function of the agent’s age, but this is not feasible here since it is assumed constant 
across the two periods and thus the age of the representative agent. 
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And following the Rogoff and Obstfeld (1996, Ch. 3 p. 137) the net aggregate savings function is given by; 
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Using this result in the expression for the current account yields:  
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This expression, although simple, is very important since it expresses the current account as a direct 
function of the age distribution of the economy proxied by the saving decisions of the young (workers) and 
old (retired).  
Within this framework and as an entirely logical feature of the life cycle hypothesis is the prediction that 
rapidly ageing societies, at some point, will enter a stage of dissaving as the assets of consumers are run 
down into old age and that this ultimately would entail old countries running external deficits. This can be 
shown in the model above by assuming a process by which the old continuously, because of lingering sub 
replacement fertility, will outnumber the young. Even though we conjecture that the young may be saving 
from a larger flow of income than the stock of which the old is dissaving it will still mean, in the limit, that 
the dissaving of the old will be larger than the saving of the young; in absolute values and assume that the 
government’s foreign asset position is neutral, ( )1Y Ot t tCA S S += + , we get: 
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In order for this to produce a current account deficit, the central assumption is that savings decline faster 
than the decline in domestic investment demand which must, in an open economy context, entail an 
external deficit since it means;  
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In a theoretical sense, this is a fundamental result in what we could call a standard OLG model since it is 
assumed that old consumers de-accumulate their entire asset base up until their demise. In a 
representative agent framework with no uncertainty, everything else would clearly be suboptimal.  
Essentially, three additions to the neo-classical model framework above may serve to differentiate the 
hypothesis of dissaving; one is the introduction of uncertainty which arises naturally as economic agents do 
not know when then they meet their demise, a second is the introduction of bequest motives, and a third 
(and most complicated) includes a correction for the nature of the pension system where one would 
assume that e.g. the presence of a generous PAY-GO system would result in considerable less dissaving as 
economic agents stand to receive substantial transfers in kind and thud do not need to run down their own 
asset base.  
This paper will not explore these additions to the neo-classical OLG model, but simply rest the argument 
with the point that it is difficult to imagine a representative agent framework in which aggregate dissaving 
does not arise, in some form of the other, as an optimal result from rapid and continuing ageing. 
Furthermore, evidence presented in Supan (2004) suggests the difficulties researchers have had, so far, 
pinning down the extent to which we should expect dissaving and when it will occur in individual 
economies.  With these points in mind, the following visual representation captures the main argument of 
this paper; 
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The X-axis in this figure essentially represents age with an increase in ageing (increase in a society’s median 
age) moving from left to right. The phases are taken from Malmberg and Sommestad (2000) which casts 
the demographic transition entirely in the light of a transition in ageing and thus a steady increase in the 
median age of society.  Conversely, the Y-axis represents the effect of age on the current account as a 
function of age. The initial important point is whether this effect is positive (above the red line) or negative 
(below the red line) and only secondarily we may begin to estimate whether the effect is numerically large 
or not. The blue line is drawn free hand and essentially depicts a standard life cycle trajectory where 
dissaving is an integral function of the effect of age on the current account as an economy ages towards a 
position in which savings will fall to such an extent that it cannot cover, the still declining, domestic 
investment demand.  The intuition behind this representation is fundamentally rooted in standard life cycle 
framework which posits a hump shaped function of savings with respect to age structure. However, an 
important additional point is taken from Higgins (1998) which presents estimations of a panel data model 
including 100 countries with savings (investment) as well as the current account balance as dependent 
variables to be modeled as a function of the age structure of society. One of the most important results 
from this study is the distinction between what is coined as the center of gravity of investment demand and 
savings supply in the context of an individual economy and how these two do not occur simultaneously 
Higgins (1998);  a finding which is corroborated for example by Feroli (2003). The best way to think about 
this is to imagine that savings and investment are in a race governed and controlled, as it were, by the 
transition in age structure which occurs as a result of the demographic transition. Initially as the transition 
sets in with a decline in mortality and where fertility only follows with a lag investment demand outruns 
the supply of savings and the economy is running an external deficit. Steadily however, the supply of 
savings catches up with investment demand which itself will begin to decline and thus the external balance 
moves into a surplus. Finally, the pace of savings accumulation is replaced by outright decumulation 
(dissaving) and the external balance moves into deficit as savings decline faster than domestic investment 
demand.  
If this constitutes the results from a stylized account of the demographic transition it is obvious that it 
cannot be held up as a determinist account for the evolution in all economies. However, it is equally clear 
that in the context of a modern manifestation of the demographic transition in which below replacement 
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fertility and an incrementally increase in life expectancy seem to be the rule rather than the exception, 
most developed economies and those aspiring to become one will face an age transition in which the 
median age will inevitably move into the region of rapid population ageing.  
Within this framework, the notion of export dependency enters as a direct attack on the assumption of 
dissaving as a function of an ever increase in a society’s median age. More specifically, the question which 
needs to be posed is not so much whether dissaving won’t occur at some point as an inevitable result of an 
ageing process which simply moves forward into the distant horizon, but rather whether it is in fact an 
optimal response and if it is not; what economies can and will do to postpone or evade the stage of 
dissaving.  
The answer to this question can be put into context by looking at the distinction between a closed economy 
and an open economy in the context of population ageing.  
Consider then first the closed economy with a rapidly ageing population as a result of lingering below 
replacement fertility. Clearly, in such an economy there is no escape from dis-saving since there are no 
external leakages through which excess investment can exit the economy. In the jargon used above, the 
race between savings and investment is off as they are tied together by laws of gravity which govern a 
closed economic system. Savings will have to equal investment in all periods and as the population ages 
investment demand will decline and consumers will dissave (in the aggregate) and domestic companies will 
respond by investing less. In the alternative event that dissaving does not occur the return on capital would 
drift ever closer to the zero bound as a function of a continuous and increasing excess supply of savings. 
This is a perfectly natural process and should, as such, not be narrated as a problem. However, taking this 
example to the extreme where fertility never recovers to above replacement levels
5
 such an economy will 
simply shrink until it is no more and along the way societal structures will be broken down and one can only 
imagine the kind of civil unrest that will emerge as social institutions and pension systems are ground 
down.  
Clearly, this example is outlandish in its extreme version and we need not entertain it as a potential 
scenario here. Yet, it should be clear that what economies such as e.g. Japan and Germany face is exactly a 
version of the scenario above, albeit in a much milder manner. The crucial difference though is that Japan 
and Germany are characterized by something else; they are both open economies.  
Consider consequently an open economy with a rapidly ageing population and, for the sake of argument, 
an expensive welfare system to finance. What would happen in the context of rapid dissaving in which the 
external balance would trend towards a negative value?  How would such an economy ever be able to 
finance a consistent external deficit? What would the return of any foreign borrowing be in such an 
economy, and how would the economy ever build up its capital accumulation potential again? Surely, these 
are relevant questions which are hardly addressed within the conventional economic models. In fact, it is 
very difficult to see how a rapidly ageing economy would ever be able to finance a persistent external 
deficit and it is likely that the evolution of such a process would be a steady stream of sovereign defaults as 
the economy cannot pay its foreign creditors each time pushing the economy down the ladder as the 
future stream of revenues from its domestic activities shrink thereby allowing less leeway towards 
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international borrowing than before. Ultimately of course this economy would have to leave international 
capital markets all together and realize that savings, after all, has to equal investment as in a closed 
economy with a dramatic drop in investment rates (and thus growth) to follow. As such, the hypothesis of 
the effect of dissaving in the context of an open economy is very difficult to reconcile with economic 
common sense and intuition; at least when taken to this extreme.  
This is where the graph above may aid our understanding. Specifically, an open capital and trade account 
allows an economy to fight the decline in aggregate demand from ageing through two main channels. One 
is that consumers instead of dissaving invest their savings abroad to earn interest income; this would 
manifest itself in a positive income balance and a decline in home bias amongst domestic investors. A 
second way would be for companies to invest more than what is warranted by domestic savings and thus to 
let capex decisions respond to foreign instead of domestic demand. This would mean that ageing, contrary 
to what the OLG and standard life cycle theory predicts, is associated with a higher propensity to run an 
external surplus or at least that dissaving becomes a sub-optimal response to ageing. In order to tie this in 
with the present theoretical framework, we might narrate this in the context of an intertemporal 
preference for savings rather than consumption which would have the effect to keep the external balance 
in surplus;  
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This intertemporal preference would transmit itself through two main channels in our economy; one would 
be for the old to dissave less drastically than assumed by the standard life cycle framework and the other 
would be for the young generation to save more to compensate for the dissaving of the old. If these two 
effects were to materialize as a function of age, we would be in the opposite situation than postulated by 
the initial model above;  
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This then becomes the main proposition of this paper in a theoretical sense; 
Proposition 1 – Although an ongoing process of ageing on a macroeconomic level will hypothetically, and in 
the limit, lead to aggregate dissaving, this may not be an optimal response. Rather, it seems plausible that 
an economy will attempt to maintain savings on a relatively higher level by exploiting the ability to 
intertemporally substitute consumption for savings by running an external surplus that materializes as the 
domestic supply of savings exceed domestic investment demand.   
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Proposition 2 (corollary to proposition 1) – Domestic demand and thus the ability to generate economic 
growth measured as e.g. headline GDP declines with age as a natural function of declining domestic 
investment demand and declining consumption.  
On the first proposition it is important to note that it is not entirely outside the grasp of an OLG model 
imbued with a more complex structure than the one above. For example one could introduce uncertainty 
which would be bound to generate an increase in savings of the older generations. Another route would be 
to include bequest motives (i.e. the desire to leave inheritances) as well as one could introduce a variable 
to correct for the nature of the pension system where one would assume that the presence of a generous 
PAYGO system would lead to a higher degree of dissaving than if agents cannot expect to receive transfers 
in kind. Finally, and something which would be very complicated in a representative agent framework, one 
would also, in the perfect world, want to correct for the effect of ageing on the saving of the young and 
working cohorts. In this sense, the OLG model remains a more versatile tool than it perhaps appears here, 
but the analysis will continue assuming that whatever model framework we might conjure some form of 
macroeconomic dissaving is a natural consequence of aggregating from a representative agent framework 
and it is this assumption that is challenged here.  
Proposition 2 may of course seem pulled rather out of the blue here, but is not unreasonable and quite 
intuitive if we think about the studies Gómez and Hérnandez (2006) and Bloom et al. (2007, 2009) which 
have shown how ageing is set to have a non-neglieble effect on the buoyancy of economic performance.  
In the following, Germany and Japan will be introduced as the subjects of analysis as well as a simple 
empirical framework will be formed to capture the notion of export reliance or outright dependency.  
 
3.0 Germany and Japan – Two Rapidly Ageing Economies 
The motivation for the choice of Japan and Germany as foundation for an empirical analysis is simple. They 
are the two oldest countries in the world measured by median age
6
 and thus also two economies where we 
should expect the effects from ageing to manifest themselves most forcefully as well as they would offer us 
a solid testing bed for the hypotheses stated above.  
Although the demographic evolution of Germany and Japan has been marked by a remarkable difference if 
we peer across the entire 20
th
 century, the last two decades look very similar in the sense that from median 
ages of about 37-38 and upwards, the two economies’ experience has been almost synchronous with Japan 
being in a slightly more advanced state of ageing than Germany.   
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Germany was considerably older than Japan in an immediate post war context and in this regard it is 
fascinating to look at the remarkable process of catch-up from the part of Japan as life expectancy has 
increased at the same as fertility has plunged (see appendix). It is interesting to note that both Japan and 
Germany, by and large, had moved through the first demographic transition in 1970 which implies that 
especially the demographic development from 1950-1970 differed considerably between the two 
economies.  
As a result of the increase in life expectancy and the sharp and lingering drop in fertility Germany and Japan 
are not only already old, they are set to age rapidly. It is clear from looking at the charts in the appendix 
that the trend is inexorably up as well as down for life expectancy and fertility respectively. These trends 
not only tell us that Japan and Germany are set to age incredibly fast over the next decades; they are 
already marked by old age which can be shown by the steady increase in dependency ratios in two 
economies.  
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The picture here is very clear and especially so for Japan where the increase in dependency ratio measured 
as the proportion of +60 to 20-60 is used. The picture in Germany appears different and unfortunately, the 
data set I have is not as detailed as the one I have from Japan. In Supan (2004) where the dependency ratio 
is defined as (65+/15-64) the projected dependency ratio for both Germany and Japan is set to increase 
markedly over the next decades. In general, it is quite interesting to benchmark Japan against Germany. 
Consequently, and while Germany is certainly among the OECD economies most affected by ageing the 
manner in which Japan has caught up with Germany (and the rest of the world) over the course of half a 
century is remarkable and the reason for this unprecedented rush towards old age is an important research 
theme in itself. 
In order to get to grips with Japan and Germany as open economies there is one initial observation that 
merits some attention. Consequently, the German economy is significantly more open than the Japanese 
measured on the conventional measure of imports and exports as a share of national output. This is 
especially seen the in the level of openness where the ratio of imports and exports to national output (in 
the period 1990 to 2008) has increased from approximately 20% to 30% in the case of Japan and from 48% 
to 89% in the case of Germany (see appendix). Intuition would lead us to believe that the integration of the 
Eurozone economies, in part at least, is to “blame” for this divergence. 
 Although Germany and Japan differ markedly on this account the similarity is restored if we look at the 
contribution of the external surplus to national savings and thus, in some sense, to output growth.  
 
 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
Q
1
-1
9
8
0
Q
3
-1
9
8
1
Q
1
-1
9
8
3
Q
3
-1
9
8
4
Q
1
-1
9
8
6
Q
3
-1
9
8
7
Q
1
-1
9
8
9
Q
3
-1
9
9
0
Q
1
-1
9
9
2
Q
3
-1
9
9
3
Q
1
-1
9
9
5
Q
3
-1
9
9
6
Q
1
-1
9
9
8
Q
3
-1
9
9
9
Q
1
-2
0
0
1
Q
3
-2
0
0
2
Q
1
-2
0
0
4
Q
3
-2
0
0
5
Q
1
-2
0
0
7
Q
3
-2
0
0
8
Souce: OECD, own calculations
Fighting Dissaving? (Japan) I/GNI (I+(X-M))/GNI
15 
 
 
 
It is interesting to scrutinize these graphs in the context of the prediction of dissaving as an inbuilt 
assumption the economic model discussed above. As is readily clear, domestic investment had indeed 
fallen as a share of national output and the fall is especially pronounced from 1990 and onwards in the 
context of Japan (the infamous lost decade) and from 1999 and onwards in relation to Germany. However, 
just because investment has declined it does not mean that savings have declined correspondingly. This is 
to say; so far, domestic investment demand has declined faster than domestic savings (on a stock basis) in 
correspondence with the argument above. This is especially visible in relation to Germany where the sharp 
decline in domestic investment from 2000 and onwards has been compensated by an increase in the 
external surplus. In Japan’s case the contribution of the external surplus to national savings is more 
constant and has actually been positive since the early 1980s. In Germany’s case, it is interesting to observe 
that with the current level of national savings is the same as it was in the beginning of the 1970s and this to 
an almost exclusive extent owes itself to the external surplus. In Japan’s case, the trend of investment as a 
share of GDP is down, and despite a continuous addition from the external surplus to national savings the 
overall trend has not been halted. Yet, it is still notable to observe the extent to which national savings 
would have declined had the external balance been in a neutral position.  
An important issue which arises in the present context is essentially of a calibration nature since while it 
could appear from the graphs above that external demand is already compensating for a decline in 
domestic investment demand, results from contemporary studies tend to show that Germany and Japan 
indeed should be running external surpluses at this point in time. The simulations presented in Henriksen 
(2000) for example show how one would expect the overall (and bilateral) current account of the US and 
Japan to be in deficit and surplus respectively up until 2020. This result is mirrored in Supan et al. (2007) 
where the presented and calibrated model shows how the OECD (ex the US) is expected to run an external 
surplus to match a US deficit up until 2030-2040. Since these two results are naturally a direct function of a 
set of assumptions on savings and investment behavior induced by demographic shifts, it indicates the 
large importance of the assumptions imbued in the model. For example, in the case of the US economy, 
Summers et al (1990) report results to indicate that the US economy should see its net foreign asset 
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position at its maximum negative level by 2010 after which it would run a surplus up until 2025 before then 
moving into a deficit as a result of dissaving into old age.  
In this sense, the confusion seems plentiful and at this point in time, and it is essentially difficult to say 
whether Germany and Japan are in a state of ageing where we should hypothetically observe dissaving on 
an aggregate level. This point is epitomized by Higgins (1998) who sets out to empirically estimate and 
essentially fit a savings schedule as a function age structure. The main point here is that while the study 
indeed shows how ageing is associated with dissaving, the estimated coefficients are not always statistically 
significant and the confidence bands are wide.  
These results which seem do not seem particularly robust across contributions would initially seem to merit 
the stated propositions above in the sense that raising questions about the nature and extent of dissaving, 
on the aggregate, seem merited. As such, the main argument remains that, for a rapidly ageing economy 
such as Japan and Germany, we are likely to observe an intertemporal preference for maintaining an 
external surplus towards the rest of the world rather than to dissave to such an extent that the economy 
will need foreign funds to finance an external deficit.  
 
4.0 Empirical Analysis 
In order to make discussion above amendable to an empirical treatment and thus to test whether Germany 
and Japan may be reliant or perhaps even dependent on exports to grow, consider the following simple 
representation of national output;  
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where Y is national income and the right hand side its components; all partial derivatives are naturally 
expected to be positive. This is an almost trivial expression since it must hold as an identity. What is 
however interesting in the present context is to check whether the coefficient for the current account has 
changed, in relation to Germany and Japan, over time. One way to express this is simply to take the first 
order partial derivative of national income with respect to the current account.  
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Specifically, we are assuming this partial derivative to be some unspecified positive function of age in order 
to capture the notion that the effect of the current account on national income increases in age. Formally, 
we have;  
 
'( ) ( )t if CA f ς=  
 
Where iς can be seen as a vector of variables where age (e.g. the median age) is expected to feature 
prominently.  
For the specification of the empirical analysis OECD’s database has been used to pull quarterly national 
accounts for Germany and Japan for the period Q2-1960 to Q3 2008
7
. In order to get comparative data for 
the two countries and to get as long a sample period as possible, OECD’s CARSA methodology
8
 is used. One 
important obstacle to the data retrieval process was the fact that the full sample time series only 
incorporates the difference between imports and exports to proxy the external balance. This is a problem 
since it omits the importance of the income balance that measures the difference between factor income 
earned abroad (by domestic investors) and factor income earned at home (by foreign investors). In Japan’s 
case this has been mitigated by pulling data for the income balance using the same methodology and then 
constructing a new times series called GNI (gross national income) which, by definition, is exactly GDP +/- 
the income balance. In this way, the current account balance is defined as net exports + the income 
balance. Unfortunately, the data for international factor income is only available from Q1-1980 and 
onwards. In the case of Germany the problem was more profound in the sense that it was not possible to 
draw data for the income balance using the CARSA methodology. In this way, estimations with Germany 
will only include net exports as a proxy for the external balance, but also then a longer sample period.  
 
 
As a simple empirical operationalization consider the following estimation equation;  
 
0t t tY CA uα β∆ = + ∆ +  
 
                                                           
7
 Q4 in the case of Japan  
8
 Seasonally adjusted, current prices, annual frequencies  
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where I have chosen a representation in the first difference to correct ex ante for the obvious spuriousness 
that would result if estimating, with OLS, the equation above in level form due to the trend in the time 
series. Formally, I assume that the time series in question are (1)I . 
In order to capture the notion that this relationship has changed over time, the estimation is performed for 
the full period as well as two sub-periods where the breaking point is chosen when the economy reaches a 
median age of 40; Q1 2001 in the context of Germany and Q1 1998 in the context of Japan. Following this 
specification, there are two interesting measures of change which would be interesting to gauge. First, it 
would be interesting to check whether the marginal effect of the change in the current account on the 
change in national output has increased and secondly it would be interesting to check whether the 
explanatory power of this model (i.e. its R-square) has increased over time. I will begin with the former.  
The question of whether an estimated coefficient is stabile over time can be addressed with the following 
estimation framework: 
 
0 1 0 2 3( ) ( )t t t t t tY D CA D CA uα β α β β∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ +  
 
This estimation follows Gujarati (2003) and Greene (2003) and more formally Chow (1960) and the idea of 
testing for structural breaks as well as quantifying this break. The dummy variable (Dt) will consequently 
take the value of 0 if we are in the first period (median age < 40) and 1 if we are in the second period 
(median age > 40). If the coefficient estimated for 1β  or 3β  is statistically different from 0 it indicates a 
structural break is present and the that the new coefficients for the intercept and current account 
respectively in period 2 is given by 0 1α β+  and 2 3β β+ . Given the theme of this study the expectation is 
that the coefficient for the current account has changed, with a positive sign, and thus that a structural 
break is present around this parameter. In Japan’s case, the estimation period is Q1-1980-Q2 to 2008-Q4 
(115 observations in the full sample) and the corresponding period for Germany will be Q2-1960 to Q3 
2008 (194 observations in the full sample). Note again that in Japan’s case the current account will be the 
trade balance plus the income balance and in Germany’s case only the trade surplus.  
 
Tabel 1 
Japan 
Summary Stats 
R-sq 0,32
F 17,30
P-Value (F) 0,00
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Variables Coefficients SE t-stat P-value 
Intercept 3 971 074,95 456 943,45 8,69 0,00
Current Account 1,36 0,80 1,70 0,09
Dummy(intercept) -4 617 695,20 738 645,84 -6,25 0,00
Dummy(Current Account) 0,90 1,02 0,88 0,38
 
Germany 
Summary Stats 
R-sq 0,0459
F 3,0492
P-Value (F) 0,0299
Variables Coefficients SE t-stat P-value 
Intercept 11.659,395 884,473 13,182 0,000
Net exports 0,176 0,142 1,239 0,217
Dummy(Intercept) 834,568 2.255,862 0,370 0,712
Dummy(Net Exports) 0,084 0,174 0,482 0,630
 
On an overall basis the results from these estimations are not particularly promising in so far as goes the 
failure to capture a structural break in the marginal effect from the external balance in either the case of 
Japan or Germany (even if the signs are as expected). In Japan’s case the dummy variable for the current 
account indicates that the marginal effect from the current account to output growth has increased by 0.9 
(in nominal currency units), but with a P-value of 0.38, it is well beyond the confines of a usable level of 
significance. In Germany’s case the result is considerably weaker with the estimation indicating an increase 
in the marginal effect of 0.084 (in nominal currency units) with a P-value of 0.63 which is far away from 
statistical significance. The only significant result in the estimations above is the dummy variable for the 
intercept in Japan which enters very a negative sign to produce an average growth rate in the second 
period of (-4.617.695 JPY plus 3.971.075 JPY) -646.620 JPY which is an interesting and telling observation in 
itself when it comes to the economic performance of Japan.   
Turning to the second question of whether there has been an increase in the overall explanatory power of 
the univariate framework above, consider the following estimation framework; 
20 
 
 
0(1)
(2)
(3)
t t t
t t t t
t t t t
Y CA u
Y CA u
Y CA u
α β
α β
α β
• • • • •
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
→∆ = + ∆ +
→ ∆ = + ∆ +
→ ∆ = + ∆ +
 
 
where the first estimation covers the full period, the second period 1, and the third period 2. The dataset is 
split following the same rule as above with a median age of 40 used as a marker to define period 1 as a 
median age <40 and period 2 as a median age >40. For Japan, this gives 71 observations in the first period 
estimation and 44 observations in the second. The corresponding numbers for Germany are 163 
observations and 31 observations. The full regression results can be consulted in the appendix but noting 
that all estimated coefficients have the expected sign (i.e. positive) and remembering that the F-stat (and 
its associated P-value) in a univariate framework is equivalent to the T-stat of the estimated beta-
coefficient, the following output will suffice; 
 
Table 2 
Japan Full Period  Period 1 Period 2 
R-sq 0,078 0,040 0,232
F 9,603 2,866 12,669
P-Value (F) 0,002 0,095 0,001
Germany Full Period  Period 1 Period 2 
R-sq 0,044 0,010 0,157
F 8,806 1,612 5,385
P-Value (F) 0,003 0,206 0,028
 
These results appear more convincing and seem to conform more strongly to expectations. Consider first 
the case of Japan where the first period regression indicates that, in the period Q2-1980 to Q4-1997, the 
variation in the current account has been able to account for about 4% of the variation in national income. 
This does not seem to vindicate a strong relationship between output growth and growth in the current 
account. This is exemplified in the simple fact that estimated coefficient for the current account is not 
significant at 5% and only barely at 10%.  Turning to the estimation for the second period the results 
suggest that the relationship between national income and the current account has increased significantly. 
The returned R-sq value indicates that the variation in the current account is able to explain 23.2% of the 
variation in national income in the second period which is a strong increase in explanatory power. This is an 
21 
 
important increase in explanatory power and suggests a strong change in the relationship between these 
two variables.  
Turning to the results for Germany the picture repeats itself albeit not as strongly as in the case of Japan. 
Initially, it is interesting to note that the regression for period 1 fails to show any significant relationship 
between the variation in net exports and the variation in national output. This is in strong contrast to the 
estimation for period 2 which indicates a stronger and significant relationship between net exports and 
national output with a returned r-sq of 0.157 and more importantly an F-stat of 5.4 with a corresponding p-
value of 0.03. Clearly, the relationship between national output and net exports is not as strong as in the 
case of Japan which may be due to the fact that the income balance is not included in the estimations for 
Germany or simply, that the relationship is not as strong.  
As a final step in the empirical analysis it is worthwhile to attempt a correction of the fact that although the 
breaking point chosen to distinguish between periods does have an underlying merit in terms of the idea as 
a median age of 40 as somewhat of a watershed, it is still somewhat arbitrary. More importantly, it is clear 
that the results are bound to very sensitive to the choice of a breaking point even if it may be wisely chosen 
at the offset. In this way, the following analysis provides a number of simulations of the proposed 
relationship between the variation in the external balance and the variation in national income/output. The 
main idea is to smooth out and essentially provide a continuous account of the relationship rather than the 
one above which is discrete by nature.  
The approach here will still be OLS but to avoid actually estimating
9
 a large number of regressions it is 
worthwhile noting the following important results in the context of a univariate OLS framework, Gujarati 
(2003).  
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Consider consequently the same regression as estimated above;  
 
0t t tY CA uα β∆ = + ∆ +  
                                                           
9
 As in estimating using, SAS, STATA, Eviews etc.  
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Applying the three results above it is now possible to represent the evolution of the relationship between 
the variation of the external balance and national income as the evolution in these three variables over 
time. The idea is then to compute the value of these three parameters as a 10 year moving average (41 
quarters/observations). This gives us 75 regressions for Japan using the data from Q1-1980 to Q4-2008 and 
155 regressions for Germany where the sample size runs from Q1-1960 to Q3-2008. The idea is that this 
simulation should provide a stronger foundation upon which to check the robustness of the results 
reported above.  The results can be studied in detail in the appendix, but the two following charts for Japan 
and Germany respectively capture the essence of the argument (with median age to the left and the R-Sq 
to the right).  
 
 
To the left on the graphs and depicted with the bar the median age is reported and since quarterly median 
ages are not reported, this time series is constructed by dividing the annual increase (or decrease) in 
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median age equally between the quarters in a given year.  On the right hand side the vector of R-Sq values 
computed in the simulations are shown with each value corresponding to a regression with 41 
observations. In terms of statistical significance, anything not including observations from 1999 and 
onwards is not significant (i.e. starting at 1989 in the graph) and in the case of Germany there has been 
three periods where the relationship between the variation in the trade balance and the variation in 
national output has been statistically significant; these correspond naturally to the three periods of 
increase seen in the graph. It is very important to note in this respect that in terms to the first two periods, 
the external balance of Germany was actually in a deficit and can thus hardly be claimed to constitute 
export reliance or dependency for that matter.  
It is natural in this case to look at the trend lines which are fitted to the time series in question
10
 and thus 
essentially these two time series as a function of time. In Japan’s case the, the values for the fitted trends 
and their R-square values are; 
0.0959 35.065
0.0027 0.004
MedianAge time
R SQ time
= +
− = −
 
 
with the R-sq of the fitted lines with respect to time being 0.9969 and 0.6628 for “median age” and “R-SQ” 
respectively. For Germany we have;  
 
0.0444 32.759
0.0004 0.0339
MedianAge time
R SQ time
= +
− = +
 
 
with the R-sq of the fitted lines equal to 0.9463 and 0.0634 for “median age” and “R-SQ” respectively.   
Not surprisingly, the relationship between time and median age appears very strong which suggests a 
strong positive time trend for both countries in question in terms of ageing. Turning to the more interesting 
question of whether the computed R-sq values also contain a time trend the result seems to clearly suggest 
so in the context of Japan while the evidence is much less clear in a German case. Consequently, there 
appears to be a strong and significant positive trend in terms of the R-sq values computed from the 
Japanese data whereas the time trend in a German context indeed is positive albeit much weaker and for 
all intent and purposes not statistically significant. In Japan’s case, and using annual values, the average 
increase in the R-sq value measuring the relationship between the change in national income and the 
change of the current account has been roughly 1% per year since 1980. In the context of Germany the 
corresponding figure is 0.16% on average since 1960, but this figure is almost definitely not statistically 
significant. In this way, the results from the analysis above seem much more robust in the case of Japan 
than in the case of Germany.  
                                                           
10
 Fitted by Excel, but essentially reflects a regression of either median age or the R-sq with time as a dependent 
variable.  
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Before leaving the empirical estimation, it is worthwhile noting that the robustness analysis above is bound 
to be quite sensitive to the fact that the sample periods differ in the two cases. Consequently, considerable 
stronger results would have been obtained if one had used the same sample period in for Germany as for 
Japan. Conversely, one would assume that had the sample period for Japan been expanded to cover the 
same breath of time in the case of Germany, the results would have been somewhat weaker. This 
highlights the fundamental calibration issue in terms of specifying when an economy can seen to be old. In 
this sense, the fact that the analysis for Japan begins at a median of roughly 35 years relative to in Germany 
where the analysis commences when the median age is about 32-33 is not unimportant.  
 
5.0 A Perspective on Global Capital Flows 
The analysis above, if taken to heart, has clear implications for global capital flows not least in relation to 
the ongoing discourse and debate on global macroeconomic imbalances.  
Consequently, it is worthwhile to note that the analysis above is contingent on the assumption that the 
extent to which an ageing economy (e.g. Germany or Japan) may develop an intertemporal preference for 
savings over consumption, the actual presence of an external surplus can only materialize in relation to 
another economy having an intertemporal preference with opposite signs; following e.g. the model in 
Buiter (1981). More importantly, whatever the intertemporal preference for savings and consumption may 
be for the collective mass of global economies, the constraint that the sum of net external position must 
equal zero still holds in all periods. These points direct us to a paradox or, if you will, a dilemma of 
important proportions in the context of the contemporary discourse on global capital flows defined as it 
were, by the notion of global macroeconomic imbalances.  
This paradox arises as a function of the simple fact that the world is ageing and in particularly so, in an 
OECD context. Thus, we are moving towards a situation where a large batch of economies will age to 
essentially unprecedented levels and needless to say; the extent to which this is associated with a desire to 
export in order to maintain growth, it cannot be a strategy followed by all, or a lot, of economies at the 
same time. The crucial question then becomes; how will, or indeed can, the process of global ageing be 
transmitted to the global economy through capital flows?  
As a starting point to answer this question I would like to draw the attention to comments made by two of 
the most prominent members of the global financial punditry in the form of US economist Paul Krugman 
(PK) and the Financial Times’ chief economics commentator Martin Wolf (MW). Starting with the former
11
 
he recently pointed to the fact that external demand was instrumental in ending the slump in Japan and 
providing a relative bounce between 2003 and 2007. As PK further goes to argue, this may present a rather 
ominous outlook since the extent to which we are all, in the OECD, currently stuck in a “Japan-style” 
liquidity trap the way out may constitute a rather crowded route. As PK poignantly points out at the end; 
And needless to say, we can’t all export ourselves out of a global slump. So, how does this end? 
                                                           
11
 Paul Krugman (2009) – The Eschatology of Lost Decades, NYT blog post  
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            Krugman 2009 
This is indeed a good question and MW makes a similar argument in a recent column
12
 where he points 
towards the fact that the global imbalances themselves may prove to be an impediment to a swift global 
recovery.  
In short, if the world economy is to get through this crisis in reasonable shape, creditworthy surplus countries must 
expand domestic demand relative to potential output. How they achieve this outcome is up to them. But only in this 
way can the deficit countries realistically hope to avoid spending themselves into bankruptcy. 
Martin Wolf (2008) 
This is of course a very appealing proposition and also goes to heart of idea that, at least, one part of the 
solution of the current global crisis lies in the resolution of global macroeconomic imbalances. But prey tell, 
how are these surplus countries going to revert towards a growth path characterized by a more balanced 
external account and perhaps even an external deficit?  
It is in this context that the argument presented in this paper becomes important. Consequently, there is a 
big risk that these surplus economies (e.g. Japan and Germany) simply will not be able to heed the call of 
MW. The main reason for this inability is then, in part, exactly to be found in the economic profile of a 
rapidly ageing economy with a median age pushing 40 year mark and beyond. Japan and Germany as well 
as the economies next in line to reach their age bracket cannot achieve growth based on domestic demand 
in a way which would allow them to suck up excess global capacity through an external deficit.  
This is a very important point to stress in the context of the global economy and future contributions 
should attempt to shed light on the manifestation of global ageing on global capital with a specific eye to 
the idea that an ageing economy may develop an intertemporal preference for savings over consumption. 
Following this, future contributions should also seek to effectively pin down the theoretical link between 
ageing and (dis)saving on an aggregate macroeconomic level since it is ultimately through this that we may 
learn how ageing will affect open economy macroeconomics and  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
In this paper, the potential link between the reliance or dependency on exports and ageing has been 
investigated in the context of Germany and Japan.Two main messages should be taken away from the 
analysis;  one theoretical and one empirical.  
On the theoretical front, this paper has argued that the hypothesis of dissaving which arises in the context 
of a standard life cycle framework may not conform well to optimal behavior from the point of view of an 
individual aggregate economy. In particular, the notion that an ageing economy may come to rely on 
external funding to supply a deficit which arises as the supply of domestic savings decline faster than 
domestic investment demand seems difficult to reconcile with rational economic behavior. Once 
reasonable doubt has been raised about this point, it does not take a large step to develop the idea that a 
                                                           
12
 Martin Wolf (2008) – Global Imbalances Threatens the Survival of Free Trade 
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rapidly ageing economy, in an open economy context, may develop an intertemporal preference for 
maintaining domestic savings consistently higher than domestic investment which will, all things equal, 
result in an external surplus. Coupled with the notion that the economy’s ability to generate top line 
growth declines as a function of the process of ageing, it may generate a situation in which an economy 
comes to rely or perhaps even becomes dependent on external demand to generate growth in national 
output.  
This brings us to the empirical results that indicate a strengthening relationship between the variation in 
the current account and the variation in national output in the context of Japan and Germany, with the 
results being more robust in relation to the former than the latter. It is naturally open for debate whether 
the results bear evidence to a situation which could be rightly described as a relationship of dependency 
between national output and external demand. However, this is nevertheless the conclusion that this paper 
emphasizes and more importantly, it leads to a simple and falsifiable hypothesis which states that the 
presence of export dependency will grow, and not only in relation to Germany and Japan, as a function of 
the inevitable process of ageing we know will occur over the course of the coming years and decades.   
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Fertility and Life Expectancy 
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Japan and Germany as open Economies 
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Regression results related to table 2 
 
Japan 
 
Whole Period (1980Q2-2008Q4)      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multipel R 0,388152    
R-kvadreret 0,150661975    
Justeret R-kvadreret 0,143145709    
Standardfejl 4187909,911    
Observationer 115    
      
ANAVA      
  Deg of freedoms SK MK F P-value (F) 
Regression 1 3,52E+14 3,52E+14 20,04479097 1,8168E-05
Residual 113 1,98E+15 1,75E+13  
I alt 114 2,33E+15      
      
  Coefficients SE t-stat P-Value  
Intercept 2308746,029 391559,5 5,896283 3,93617E-08 
Current Account 1,056054291 0,235877 4,477141 1,81678E-05 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
First Period (1980Q2-1997Q4)      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multipel R 0,23997575    
R-kvadreret 0,057588361    
Justeret R-kvadreret 0,043930221    
Standardfejl 3758723,001    
Observationer 71    
      
ANAVA      
  Deg of freedoms SK MK F P-value (F) 
Regression 1 5,95695E+13 5,95695E+13 4,216413209 0,043827287
Residual 69 9,74832E+14 1,4128E+13  
I alt 70 1,0344E+15      
      
  Coefficients SE t-stat P-Value  
Intercept 3951200,588 453030,0306 8,721718918 9,589E-13 
Current Account 0,585325707 0,285053263 2,053390662 0,043827287 
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Second Period (1998Q1-
2008Q4)      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multipel R 0,559323219    
R-kvadreret 0,312842463    
Justeret R-kvadreret 0,29648157    
Standardfejl 3565165,661    
Observationer 44    
      
ANAVA      
  Deg of freedoms SK MK F P-value (F) 
Regression 1 2,4304E+14 2,4304E+14 19,12135538 7,91939E-05
Residual 42 5,33837E+14 1,27104E+13  
I alt 43 7,76877E+14      
      
  Coefficients SE t-stat P-Value  
Intercept -94281,81853 538979,7015-0,174926474 0,861977973 
Current Account 1,332909585 0,304818523 4,372797203 7,91939E-05 
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Germany 
 
Whole Period Q2-1960 to Q3 2008     
      
Regression Statistics     
Multipel R 0,209412044    
R-kvadreret 0,043853404    
Justeret R-kvadreret 0,038873474    
Standardfejl 11245,46122    
Observationer 194    
      
ANAVA      
  Deg of freedoms SK MK F P-value (F) 
Regression 1 1113613794 1113613794 8,806027905 0,003384
Residual 192 24280396428 126460398,1  
I alt 193 25394010222      
      
  Coefficients SE t-stat P-Value  
Intercept 11808,0377 809,3735788 14,58910694 6,23507E-33 
Net exports 0,238258076 0,080289287 2,967495224 0,003384327 
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First Period Q2-1960 to Q4 2000      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multipel R 0,099560425    
R-kvadreret 0,009912278    
Justeret R-kvadreret 0,003762665    
Standardfejl 11019,77698    
Observationer 163    
      
ANAVA      
  Deg of freedoms SK MK F P-value (F) 
Regression 1 195736263 195736263 1,611853929 0,206063442
Residual 16119551113028121435484,6  
I alt 16219746849291      
      
  Coefficients SE t-stat P-Value  
Intercept 11659,39515 863,135698213,50818322 2,77467E-28 
Net exports 0,176448934 0,1389812451,269588094 0,206063442 
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Second Period Q1-2001 to Q3 2008      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multipel R 0,395753124    
R-kvadreret 0,156620535    
Justeret R-kvadreret 0,127538485    
Standardfejl 12698,726    
Observationer 31    
      
ANAVA      
  Deg of freedoms SK MK F P-value (F) 
Regression 1 8,68E+08 8,68E+08 5,385470847 0,027540633
Residual 29 4,68E+09 1,61E+08  
I alt 30 5,54E+09      
      
  Coefficients SE t-stat P-Value  
Skæring 12493,96345 2333,728 5,35365 9,49466E-06 
Net exports 0,260221928 0,112133 2,320662 0,027540633 
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Graphs for Robustness Results  
In order to understand the numbers behind these graphs I refer to the Data CD and the tab labeled 
“simulation” which will give you the details on how the numbers are constructed. Essentially, these values 
are moving average representations (10 years) of regressions and thus attempt to catch the development 
of the relationship between net exports (the current account) and output growth. The regression used to 
do the simulation is the same univariate regression as reported above.  
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